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PLEDGE, PROMISE, OR COMMIT: NEW YORK’S TENUOUS 




A decade has passed since Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White,1 the landmark Supreme Court decision loosening speech re-
strictions on judicial candidates.2  White involved the announcements 
of legal and political views.3  New York limits speech concerning the 
extent to which judicial candidates may pledge, promise, or commit 
to legal or political positions.4  As these categories partially overlap 
in their applicability to a given campaign statement, New York judi-
cial candidates must carefully navigate what they can and cannot say 
to avoid disciplinary censure.5  This Article sets out to determine the 
precise delineation of what can and cannot be said in New York and 
whether the legal speech that remains is a constitutionality valid lim-
it.  Ultimately, the restrictions are problematic because of the limited 
state interest in restricting judicial candidate speech6 and the false 
idea that speech that does not favor one set of legal interests or class 
of litigants over another can be sufficiently meaningful to the elec-
torate to satisfy the relevant First Amendment interests.7 
White concerned First Amendment limitations on Minnesota’s 
ability to prohibit judicial candidates “from announcing their views 
 
* Law Clerk, United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, 2013-2014.  
Associate, Carter Ledyard & Milburn, 2012-2013.  J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 
2012; B.A., Harvard College, 2008.  I am grateful to Professor Zephyr Teachout for her 
guidance in the development of this article. 
1 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
2 Id. at 768, 788. 
3 Id. at 768. 
4 Matter of Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735, 736 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam). 
5 Id.  
6 Walter M. Weber, Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions: Some Litigation Nuts and 
Bolts, 68 ALB. L. REV. 635, 642 (2005).   
7 Nat Stern, The Looming Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 38 
SETON HALL L. REV. 63, 64 (2008).  
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on disputed legal and political issues.”8  This prohibition in Minneso-
ta’s Code of Judicial Conduct, known as the “announce clause,” had 
been based on the 1972 American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct.9  The petitioner, a candidate for the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, had distributed literature criticizing the 
court’s decisions.10  Following a disciplinary inquiry, the petitioner 
filed suit seeking a declaration that the clause was unconstitutional 
because it forced him to refrain from announcing views on disputed 
issues.11  The lower federal courts rejected these claims.12 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, identified that “the an-
nounce clause prohibits a judicial candidate from stating his views on 
any specific nonfanciful legal question within the province of the 
court for which he is running, except in the context of discussing past 
decisions,” as long as the candidate does not oppose stare decisis.13  
Respondents pointed out that the clause left room for discussions 
about candidate character, education, and work habits, as well as spe-
cific positions on issues such as cameras in the courtroom.14 
The Court applied strict scrutiny because the clause “prohibits 
speech on the basis of its content and burdens” the speech of candi-
dates for public office, which is a core First Amendment freedom.15  
Scalia evaluated the state interests of impartiality and the appearance 
of impartiality, finding that the clause was not narrowly tailored be-
cause while impartiality is a concern based on parties, the announce 
clause restricts speech not for or against parties, but for or against is-
sues.16  The clause also does not serve the interest of judicial open-
mindedness because sitting judges may state their views in classes, 
 
8 White, 536 U.S. at 768. 
9 Id.  The ABA canon was changed in 1990 due to First Amendment concerns.  Id. at 773 
n.5.  It was replaced with a canon prohibiting judicial candidates from making “statements 
that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues 
that are likely to come before the court.”  Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10 Id. at 768.  The literature criticized a decision to exclude confessions from “criminal 
defendants that were not tape-recorded” as an indication that the court did not trust the po-
lice.  White, 536 U.S. at 771.  The literature also “criticized a decision requiring public fi-
nancing of abortions for poor women as ‘unprecedented’ and a ‘pro-abortion stance.’ ”  Id.  
11 Id. at 769-70. 
12 Id. at 770. 
13 Id. at 773. 
14 White, 536 U.S. at 774. 
15 Id.  To survive strict scrutiny the clause must be “(1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a 
compelling state interest.”  Id. at 774-75. 
16 Id. at 775-76. 
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books, and speeches, and candidate positions make up a small pro-
portion of the positions sitting judges will take over the course of 
their careers.17 
Scalia identified the tension between the election of judges 
and the announce clause “which places most subjects of interest to 
the voters off limits.”18  This is not surprising because the ABA, the 
original proponent of the clause, has long been a supporter of judicial 
merit selection and an opponent of elections.19  While opposition to 
elections may be well grounded, the First Amendment does not allow 
this goal to be achieved by leaving elections in place but “preventing 
candidates from discussing what the elections are about.”20 
Scalia distinguished the announce clause from the clause in 
the state code prohibiting candidates “from making ‘pledges or prom-
ises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial perfor-
mance of the duties of the office,’—a prohibition that is not chal-
lenged here and on which we express no view.”21  Thus, announcing 
views “on an issue covers much more than promising to decide an is-
sue a particular way.”22 
Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented.23  
Ginsburg identified distinctions between judges and other elected of-
ficials that should lead to different First Amendment treatment.24  Un-
like other elected officials, “[j]udges . . . are not political actors,” and 
“they serve no faction or constituency.”25 
Ginsburg emphasized the importance of Minnesota’s pledges 
or promises clause.26  The “judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment 
corresponds to the litigant’s [due process] right . . . to ‘an impartial 
and disinterested tribunal.’ ”27  When candidates make promises 
about issues that may reach the courts, if they are elected they “will 
be under pressure to resist the pleas of litigants who advance posi-
 
17 Id. at 778-79. 
18 White, 536 U.S. at 787. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 787-88. 
21 Id. at 770 (citation omitted) (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002)). 
22 Id. 
23 White, 536 U.S. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 803-05. 
25 Id. at 806. 
26 Id. at 812-13. 
27 Id. at 813 (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)). 
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tions contrary to her pledges on the campaign trail.”28  However, 
“[u]ncoupled from the Announce Clause, the ban on pledges or 
promises is easily circumvented.  By prefacing a campaign commit-
ment with the caveat, ‘although I cannot promise anything,’ . . . a 
candidate could declare with impunity how she would decide specific 
issues.”29  The announce clause is therefore an indispensable part of 
the pledge or promises clause and “constitutional for the same rea-
sons.”30 
White had a nationwide impact on state judicial conduct 
codes.31  New York has a pledge or promise clause, but not an an-
nounce clause.32  In the aftermath of White, the New York Court of 
Appeals decided Matter of Shanley.33  The petitioner sought review 
of a decision of the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct 
(“Commission”) concerning “campaign literature in which she [had] 
identified herself as a ‘Law and order Candidate.’ ”34 
“In the Commission’s view, the phrase created the appearance 
that petitioner would favor the prosecution, and amounted to an im-
permissible pledge as to how she would decide cases.”35  According 
to widely held perceptions, “the phrase promises stern treatment of 
criminal defendants.”36  The Court of Appeals disagreed with the re-
sult, finding that the phrase did not compromise judicial impartiali-
 
28 White, 536 U.S. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
29 Id. at 819. 
30 Id. at 820-21. 
31 See Stern, supra note 7 (stating that many states revised their judicial codes of conduct 
following White). 
32 See infra note 35. 
33 774 N.E.2d 735 (N.Y. 2002) (decided July 1, 2002).  White was decided on June 27, 
2002.  536 U.S. 765. 
34 Shanley, 774 N.E.2d at 736.  Commission decisions are appealed directly to the Court 
of Appeals.  N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 44(7) (McKinney 2012). 
35 Shanley, 774 N.E.2d at 736.  The actions at issue would violate the state’s Rules Gov-
erning Judicial Conduct prohibiting judicial candidates from making “pledges or promises of 
conduct in office” that are inconsistent with the “impartial performance of the [adjudicative] 
duties of the office” and “with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to 
come before the court,” make commitments that are inconsistent with the “impartial perfor-
mance of the [adjudicative] duties of the office.”  See id. (referencing N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. 
& REGS. tit. 22, § 100.5(A)(4)(d)(i-ii)).  The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides 
that “a judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . in connection with cases, controversies, or 
issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that 
are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.”  
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1(A)(13) (2010). 
36 Shanley, 774 N.E.2d at 737. 
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ty.37  “ ‘Law and order’ is a phrase widely and indiscriminately used 
in everyday parlance and election campaigns.  We decline to treat it 
as a ‘commit[ment]’ or a ‘pledge[] or promise[] of conduct in of-
fice.’ ”38 
The next year the Court of Appeals decided Matter of Wat-
son.39  In the course of his campaign for judicial office, William Wat-
son sent a letter to law enforcement personnel asking them to “put a 
real prosecutor on the bench.”40  Watson indicated in a newspaper 
advertisement that “he had ‘proven experience in the war against 
crime.’ ”41  Watson also made a statement to a reporter indicating that 
he would reduce court caseloads by cracking down on crime, causing 
criminals to go elsewhere.42 
The Court of Appeals identified tension with White, finding 
the pledges or promises clause at issue in the case “sufficiently cir-
cumscribed” to withstand First Amendment scrutiny.43  The clause is 
limited because it “precludes only those statements of intention that 
single out a party or class of litigants for special treatment” or convey 
a candidate will behave inconsistently with their judicial duties, leav-
ing permissible “most statements identifying a point of view.”44 
[S]tatements that merely express a viewpoint do not 
amount to promises of future conduct.  On the other 
hand, candidates need not preface campaign state-
ments with the phrase “I promise” before their re-
marks may reasonably be interpreted by the public as 
a pledge to act or rule in a particular way if elected.  A 
candidate’s statements must be reviewed in their total-
ity and in the context of the campaign as a whole to 
determine whether the candidate has unequivocally ar-
ticulated a pledge or promise of future conduct . . . .45 
Here, Watson violated this rule by expressing a bias in favor of the 
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (alteration in original).  The Court of Appeals affirmed the sanctions on the judge on 
other grounds.  Id. 
39 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam). 
40 Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41 Id. at 3. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 5-8. 
44 Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 7. 
45 Id. at 4. 
5
Hertz-Bunzl: Pledge, Promise, or Commit
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
574 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
police and implying he would use his powers to keep certain kinds of 
defendants out of the city, and did so repeatedly throughout the cam-
paign.46 
In 2009, the Commission considered charges against Margaret 
Chan stemming from her election campaign for New York City Civil 
Court.47  Chan had released literature advertising a planned lecture 
that stated, “Margaret Chan and Veteran Tenant Attorney Steven 
DeCastro will show you how to stick up for your rights, beat your 
landlord, . . . and win in court!”48 
The Commission identified violations of the pledges, promis-
es, and commitments clauses.49 
[Chan’s] literature may have given prospective voters 
the impression that she would favor tenants over land-
lords in housing matters, which are often the subject of 
Civil Court proceedings.  By distributing such litera-
ture, which appeared to commit herself with respect to 
issues likely to come before her court, she compro-
mised her impartiality.50 
Commission member Richard D. Emery dissented.51  Emery 
pointed out that the literature only “may have led a prospective voter 
to conclude that [Judge Chan] would favor tenants,” which is not 
enough to show a promise, pledge, or commitment.52  “[A]n election 
campaign by necessity must be designed to appeal to voters based on 
the candidate’s history and activities.”53  “If certain constituents feel 
they can predict a judicial candidate’s views on controversial subjects 
that s/he may have to someday face in court, that is part of the price 
 
46 Id.  The court upheld the ruling of the Commission, but modified the sanction from re-
moval to censure.  Id. at 8. 
47 Matter of Chan, 2010 N.Y. ANN. REP. 124-26, available at http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Publications/ 
AnnualReports/nyscjc.2010annualreport.pdf#page= [hereinafter Chan]. 
48 Id. at 126 (alterations in original).  The Commission also considered other violations 
relating to the personal solicitation of campaign contributions and a misrepresentation of an 
endorsement.  Id. at 124-26. 
49 Id. at 127. 
50 Id.  Based on this and other violations, the Commission admonished Chan.  Chan, supra 
note 47, at 128. 
51 Id. at 129 (Emery, Comm’r, dissenting).  The Commission has eleven members and 
each serves a renewable four-year term.  See Commission Members, N.Y. COMMISSION ON 
JUD. CONDUCT, http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/General.Information/Gen.Info.Pages/members.htm 
(last updated Apr. 2, 2013). 
52 Chan, supra note 47, at 129 (Emery, Comm’r, dissenting). 
53 Id. 
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we pay for the free flow of information critical to the electoral choice 
of judges.”54 
Emery recognized that the Court of Appeals in Watson held 
that implied promises of future conduct may be the basis for disci-
pline, a decision “in tension with White.”55  But, while Watson in-
volved implicit promises and commitments, Chan’s criticism of land-
lords does not rise to an implied promise because a voter only may 
have come to the conclusion that she was pledging to rule a certain 
way.56  By finding misconduct for statements that urge “voters to 
know their rights against landlords,” which is not an actual pledge, 
promise, or commitment, “the Commission is adding a gloss on 
White that cannot be justified by any reading of that decision.”57 
In 2010, the Commission considered written complaints 
against Rensselaer County Supreme Court Justice Patrick J. McGrath 
for a letter he sent during his campaign to pistol permit holders.58  
The text of the letter stated the following: 
As your County Judge for the past 14 years, I have 
been responsible for all pistol permits in Rensselaer 
County.  My pistol permit is very important to me as I 
know yours is to you . . . .   
. . . . 
As Supreme Court Justice . . . I will still be re-
sponsible for all pistol permits in Rensselaer County.59 
The Commission found that the statements conveyed bias to favor 
pistol permit holders and their interests, reinforcing an implied prom-
ise that he would look after their interests and thus violated the rule 
against improper pledges, promises, and commitments.60  “Campaign 
statements that single out a particular class of litigants for special 
treatment are inconsistent with judicial impartiality and the appear-
 
54 Id. at 130. 
55 Id. at 131. 
56 Id. at 132.  Emery noted that New York’s rules were changed in 2006 to remove the 
prohibition on statements that “ ‘appear to commit’ the candidate with respect to controver-
sies and issues . . . limiting misconduct to an express commitment.”  Chan, supra note 47, at 
132. 
57 Id. at 131. 
58 Matter of McGrath, 2011 N.Y. ANN. REP. 120-21, available at 
http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Publications/AnnualReports/nyscjc.2011annualreport.pdf#page= 
[hereinafter McGrath]. 
59 Id. at 121 (third alteration in original). 
60 Id. at 122-23. 
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ance of impartiality . . . .”61 
The Commission made a number of decisions on similar is-
sues prior to White.62  In the following three instances, the Commis-
sion found a violation of the “pledges and promises” and “commit or 
appear to commit” clauses.63  Matter of Birnbaum involved a bro-
chure that “asserted that voters had a ‘clear choice’ between respond-
ent . . . a tenant, and his opponent . . . a landlord.”64  The “literature 
gave the unmistakable impression that he would favor tenants over 
landlords in housing matters.”65 
Matter of Hafner, Jr. involved literature “that stated: ‘Are you 
tired of seeing career criminals get a ‘slap’ on the wrist?  So am I’” 
and the phrase, referring to an opponent, that “[s]oft judges make 
hard criminals!”66  The literature implied respondent “would deal 
harshly with all such defendants, rather than judge the merits of indi-
vidual cases.”67  Matter of La Cava involved a letter sent to Right-to-
Life Party members in which the candidate “asserted his ‘commit-
ment to the sanctity of life from the moment of conception’ ” and an 
interview with a reporter in which the candidate stated that abortion 
is murder.68  This statement “created the appearance” that La Cava 
“might not follow constitutional and statutory law if called upon to 
do so.”69 
The New York State Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics 
(“Ethics Committee”) is an independent body that responds to written 
ethics inquiries from state judges.70  The Ethics Committee has de-
 
61 Id. at 123. 
62 See infra note 64. 
63 See Matter of Hafner, Jr., 2001 N.Y. ANN. REP. 113-14 (2001), available at 
http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Publications/AnnualReports/nyscjc.2001annualreport.pdf#page= 
[hereinafter Hafner, Jr.]; Matter of La Cava, 2000 N.Y. ANN. REP. 124 (2000), available at 
http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Publications/AnnualReports/nyscjc.2000annualreport.pdf#page= 
[hereinafter La Cava]; Matter of Birnbaum, 1998 N.Y. ANN. REP. 74 (1998), available at 
http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Publications/AnnualReports/nyscjc.1998annualreport.pdf#page= 
[hereinafter Birnbaum].  The “appear to commit” language was removed in 2006.  See supra 
note 56. 
64 Birnbaum, supra note 63, at 73.  The brochure included quotations favorable to re-
spondent from tenants who appeared before him in housing court, including tenants in cases 
then pending before respondent.  Id. 
65 Id. at 74. 
66 Hafner, Jr., supra note 63, at 113 (first alteration in original). 
67 Id. at 114. 
68 LaCava, supra note 63, at 123. 
69 Id. at 124. 
70 About the ACJE: Organization and Purpose, N.Y. ST. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUD. 
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termined that a candidate should not respond to a questionnaire from 
a pro-Second Amendment organization because the form “contains 
requests for positions on issues which may regularly come before the 
inquiring judge should the judge” be elected.71  The Ethics Commit-
tee has held that a candidate may not distribute campaign statements 
that indicate an opposition to engaging in plea-bargaining in criminal 
cases as it would constitute an impermissible pledge or promise.72  
The Ethics Committee did find that it would be permissible to include 
in campaign literature a photograph taken with a relative, a state 
trooper in uniform, as long as the context did not suggest the candi-
date would favor law enforcement interests.73 
Judicial candidates are given advice about how to campaign 
within the boundaries of the law.  The New York State Bar Associa-
tion has placed on its website a guide for judicial candidates that in-
cludes a section on avoiding campaign “[p]itfalls.”74 
[A] public pronouncement of these views [on disputed 
legal or political issues] may be seen as an indication 
of how the candidate would decide cases as a judge 
and would give the impression that the candidate 
would not approach a case involving those issues with 
an open mind.  Accordingly, the candidate should not 
announce his or her views on disputed legal or politi-
cal issues if it is foreseeable that such issues may bear 
upon a case that may come before the court in the fu-
ture.75 
The advice to judicial candidates is that to be on the safe side, a can-
didate should say less rather than more about their views. 
 
ETHICS, available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/acje/whatis.shtml (last visited May 10, 
2013). 
71 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 99-33 (1999), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/99-33_.htm.  The rules applied were the 
pledge or promise clause and the commit or appear to commit clause.  Id. 
72 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 04-95 (2004), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/04-95_.htm. 
73 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 07-136 (2007), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/07-136.htm. 
74 See The High Road—Rules for Conducting a Judicial Campaign in New York, N.Y. ST. 
BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON JUD. CAMPAIGN CONDUCT, available at 
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ForAttorneys/ProfessionalStandardsforAttor
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The vast majority of states that have judicial elections have 
some form of a pledge, promise, or commit clause in their canons of 
judicial conduct.76  The constitutionality of such clauses after White 
has been the subject of litigation in other states.  The Supreme Court 
of Florida has upheld the clauses.77  Other courts have upheld the 
clauses with narrow constructions.78  A number of federal district 
courts have found the provisions to be unconstitutional, on their 
face79 or as applied.80  Some federal appellate courts have rejected 
challenges to the clauses based on ripeness or standing grounds.81  
The general consensus among the scholarship is that the promises 
clauses are on shaky ground after White.82 
There is a strong free speech interest at play.  Judicial elec-
 
76 See Judicial Campaigns and Elections: Campaign Conduct, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign_cond
uct.cfm?state= (last visited May 10, 2013).  Thirty-nine states have some version of a 
“commit” clause.  Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 207-09, 218 (6th Cir. 2010) (remand-
ing to the District Court on the question of the clause’s constitutionality). 
77 In re Kinsey, 842 So.2d 77, 87 (Fla. 2003) (stating pledge, promise, commit, and appear 
to commit clauses serve a “compelling state interest in preserving the integrity of our judici-
ary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary”). 
78 See Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351, 356, 382, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(finding the clauses constitutional, but that the clauses, narrowly construed, allow judicial 
candidates to answer questionnaires from the Pennsylvania Family Institute and other 
groups); Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 196 P.3d 1162, 1174-75 (Kan. 2008) (stating clauses 
permit statements of viewpoints, but not pledges, promises or commitments that bind judges 
to a particular disposition on a certain issue or controversy). 
79 See N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1039 (D.N.D. 2005) 
(pledge, promise, and commitment clauses are too broadly tailored to serve the interests of 
judicial impartiality toward parties and are protected by White); Family Trust Found. of Ky., 
Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 697-98, 703 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (the clauses impermis-
sibly burden free speech because “the types of general promises prohibited by the clauses are 
merely announcements of legal views” which are protected). 
80 Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (the provisions are not 
unconstitutional on their face but would be as applied to judicial candidates responding to a 
survey from Wisconsin Right to Life). 
81 See Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 844 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (vacating on ripeness grounds); Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 716-18 (7th Cir. 
2010) (affirming on ripeness grounds); Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (affirming on standing and ripeness grounds). 
82 See Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the Re-
sponse to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 607-08 (2004); Stern, supra 
note 7, at 121; Note, The Rule of Law in the Marketplace of Ideas: Pledges or Promises by 
Candidates for Judicial Election, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1532 (2009) [hereinafter The 
Rule of Law].  But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: What 
are the Alternatives?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1327, 1345 (2008); Gerald Stern, A Fine 
Line: The First Amendment and Judicial Campaigns, 77 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 16-17 (2005). 
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tions may be inferior to the appointment of judges.83  But if we are to 
have elections, they should be elections in which voters have mean-
ingful choice.84  If voters cannot pick candidates based on issues, oth-
er factors will decide judicial elections.85  Voters may choose a judge 
solely based on resume or qualifications, instead of choosing a judge 
with whom they politically or legally identify.  In addition, the lack 
of information for voters may allow for the increased influences of 
the legal establishment, party leadership, or pure cronyism. 
On the other hand, the state has a strong interest in an impar-
tial judiciary.86  This interest may be persuasive in connection to the 
announce, pledge, promise, or commit clauses.  For example, it cer-
tainly would be problematic if a sitting judge revealed a position that 
implicated a case directly before his or her courtroom at that time.87  
This is less of a concern with non-incumbent judicial candidates. 
In the scheme of issues facing states in the administration of 
judicial elections, however, broad restrictions on judicial speech 
should be a minor concern.  A far more serious concern should be the 
role of money in judicial elections.88  Judicial election spending has 
more than doubled between 2000 and 2009 compared to the 1990s, 
and was especially high during the 2010 elections.89  A majority of 
Americans believe that campaign funding buys “favorable legal out-
comes.”90  The Supreme Court has recently ruled that due process re-
quired a state supreme court judge to recuse himself in a situation in 
 
83 See White, 536 U.S. at 787-88. 
84 Id. at 788. 
85 See Stephen Gillers, “If Elected I Promise [______]”—What Should Judicial Candi-
dates Be Allowed to Say?, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 733 (2002) (“Absent information about a 
candidate’s views on legal questions that may come before his or her court, voters will have 
to rely solely on information whose relationship to professional merit is often marginal-party 
affiliation, advertisements that emphasize symbols and dramatic scenes, the ethnic identity 
of candidates, and endorsements.”). 
86 White, 536 U.S. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
87 Sitting judges in New York are prohibited from making “any public comment about a 
pending or impending proceeding in any court.” Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, N.Y. 
COMP. CODES, R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 100.3(B)(8).  Sitting judges are also bound by the pledge, 
promise, and commit prohibitions.  Id. at § 100.3(B)(9).  See also The Rule of Law, supra 
note 82, at 1531 (“[P]rohibiting statements regarding individual cases or litigants would not 
sweep in constitutionally protected speech . . . . ”). 
88 Adam Skaggs & Andrew Silver, Promoting Fair and Impartial Courts Through Recusal 
Reform, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (2011),  available at  http://brennan.3cdn.net/09c926c04c9eed5290 
_e4m6iv2v0.pdf. 
89 Id. at 1-2. 
90 Id. at 1. 
11
Hertz-Bunzl: Pledge, Promise, or Commit
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
580 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
which a contributor gave that judge $3 million and the judge ruled 
significantly in the contributor’s favor.91  It is true that the promises 
clauses speak to a related interest of the litigant to air disputes “be-
fore judges who have not committed to rule against them before the 
opening brief is read.”92 
Commission member Richard Emery has expressed similar 
frustrations about the New York rules.  Emery concurred and dissent-
ed to the removal of Judge Thomas Spargo, who provided coffee and 
doughnuts to voters and committed other violations of the rules.93  
Emery found it “ironic” that the rules punish small giveaways to vot-
ers, but allow candidates to receive contributions from party officials, 
“as well as from the lawyers whose very livelihoods depend on the 
judges who receive their contributions.”94  The rules “are a patchwork 
of compromises and ad hoc judgments which fail to address the cen-
tral causes of the unseemliness of judicial campaigns: party control 
and the candidate’s need to raise money.”95 
Therefore, the rules, according to Emery, are not narrowly tai-
lored because they restrict candidates in the “opposite way one would 
expect in order to safeguard judicial integrity.”96  Counteracting the 
role of money in judicial campaigns is a much more urgent state in-
terest than limiting what political positions candidates can take in an 
election.  If there is a compelling state interest in an impartial judici-
ary, there are rules that the state can implement which would be far 
more effective toward reaching this goal and far less prohibitive on 
core speech interests than limiting judicial speech. 
A pressing concern for New York judicial candidates might 
be to determine what exactly is or is not prohibited by state rules and 
 
91 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872-74 (2009).  New York’s recusal 
rules have recently been strengthened.  See William Glaberson, New York Takes Step on 
Money in Judicial Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/ 
14/nyregion/14judges.html?_r=0. 
92 Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 207 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 
887). 
93 Matter of Spargo, 2007 N.Y. ANN. REP. 136-37 (2007), available at 
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Publications/AnnualReports/nyscjc.2007annualreport.pdf (Emery 
supported the determinations on some charges and not others). 
94 Id. at 140. 
95 Id. at 141. 
96 Matter of Farrell, 2005 N.Y. ANN. REP. 160-61 (2005), 166, available at 
http://www.cjc.ny.gov/Publications/AnnualReports/nyscjc.2005annualreport.pdf (Emery 
concurred in finding that the judge violated the rules through improper political party sup-
port). 
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precedents.  Matter of Watson would suggest that the key metric for 
determining when a judicial statement is an unlawful pledge, prom-
ise, or commitment is when a class or party of litigants is singled out 
for special treatment.97  William Watson therefore violated the rules 
by showing a bias in favor of the police, and Margaret Chan violated 
the rules by showing a bias in favor of tenants.98 
Matter of Shanley provides an exception to Watson.99  The 
phrase “[l]aw and order [c]andidate” was permissible because it is a 
phrase used in everyday parlance.100  It is also permissible for a can-
didate to appear in a photograph taken with a relative, a state trooper 
in uniform.101  Thus, not very well-developed statements by candi-
dates are likely permissible.102  While you cannot advertise a lecture 
with a pro-tenant activist to show attendees how to stick up for their 
rights,103 it is likely permissible to merely state you are a pro-tenant 
candidate.104  While stating your support of “law and order” is per-
missible, expressing the same sentiment, repeatedly and enthusiasti-
cally in different forums, as in Watson, is not.105 
There may be some logic to this approach.  An announcement 
and a promise could be distinguished by the degree to which you 
seem willing to follow up on your words, and the demonstration of an 
attachment to a certain position would be the evidence.  But this is an 
ill-conceived method of making the distinction.  The import is that if 
voters will be unable to get a true picture of your intentions, you can 
 
97 See Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 7.  Judicial candidates may also violate these clauses by 
conveying that their behavior will be inconsistent with their judicial duties.  Id.  By making 
pro-life statements, the Commission found that Justice La Cava conveyed he might not fol-
low constitutional and statutory precedent.  La Cava, supra note 63, at 124.  This is similar 
but distinct from the idea that La Cava might favor pro-life over pro-choice interests. 
98 See Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 4-5; Chan, supra note 47, at 126. 
99 Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735. 
100 Id. at 737. 
101 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 07-136 (2007), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/07-136.htm. 
102 It is possible that it is not permissible to make a not very well-developed statement if it 
is not an ordinary sentiment that is commonly heard.  The Ethics Committee frowned upon a 
judicial candidate’s opposition to plea-bargaining, which is less of a commonplace sentiment 
than being a “law and order candidate” but was not a very well-developed sentiment.  See 
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 04-95 (2004), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/04-95_.htm.  
103 See Chan, supra note 47, at 126. 
104 But see Birnbaum, supra note 63, at 74 (pre-Shanley case reaching the opposite result 
where voters were told they had a clear choice in the election between a tenant and a land-
lord).   
105 Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 5.  
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say it.  But if you make sure voters understand your position by driv-
ing it home repeatedly, you can’t.  In other words, you can make 
what in effect are promises, but only in a muffled manner such that 
voters pay them no mind because it is “everyday” speech.106  It would 
be better to decide, in principle, what sentiments candidates can ex-
press, not how loud or forcefully candidates should be able to say 
those things. 
It is likely impermissible for a judicial candidate to respond to 
questionnaires from political organizations.  A 1999 Ethics Commis-
sion opinion indicates that judicial candidates may not respond to 
questionnaires if the questions pertain to issues that may come before 
the judge, as it would amount to a pledge, promise, commitment, or 
appearance of commitment.107  This issue has been especially conten-
tious in other states where some courts have determined that a survey 
of views is more like an announcement than a promise as the context 
indicates that a judge is not being asked to make specific commit-
ments but only to set out an assortment of views.108 
Ultimately the key distinction in New York is that a statement 
is unlawful when it favors a single class of litigants.109  Under this ru-
bric, William Watson and Walter Hafner violated the rule by favoring 
law enforcement over criminal defendants.110  Margaret Chan and Ar-
thur Birnbaum violated the rule by favoring tenants over landlords.111  
Patrick McGrath violated this rule by favoring the interests of gun-
owners over the interests of non gun-owners.112 
However, it is hard to imagine any contested legal or political 
issue voters would care about in selecting a judge that does not in-
volve favoring some classes of litigants over others in some way.  
Voters who care about crime will want a judge whose approach to 
crime would logically, in one way or another, disfavor criminals or 
criminal defendants if followed through.  Voters who care about ten-
ants will in some way want an advantage for tenants over landlords; 
presumably this is why they would take the time to select a judge 
who shares their interests.  An announcement of views on a disputed 
 
106 Shanley, 774 N.E.2d at 737. 
107 N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 99-33 (1999), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/99-33_.htm. 
108 Duwe, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 976; Pa. Family Inst., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d at 387. 
109 Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 7. 
110 Id. at 4; Hafner, Jr., supra note 63, at 113-14. 
111 Chan, supra note 47, at 126; Birnbaum, supra note 63, at 74. 
112 McGrath, supra note 58, at 123. 
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issue lacks substantive meaning for voters if it cannot be coupled 
with some plan to act in a certain way while on the bench. 
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in White, argued for the retention 
of the announce clause in order to preserve the promise clauses; 
without the announce clause, all promises could be disguised as non-
binding announcements.113  But the inverse is also true.  If a prohibi-
tion on announcements is unconstitutional, it is difficult to preserve a 
prohibition on promises, since many announcements can be con-
strued as binding promises.  This overlap is compounded by the in-
herent difficulty in distinguishing an announcement from a promise 
at all.  A candidate’s pro-life stance, for instance, runs the risk of be-
ing interpreted as either.114 
In addition, keeping one prohibition and not the other may 
create a chilling effect in which judicial candidates are intimidated 
from making constitutionally permissible announcements.115  Advice 
given to New York judicial candidates indicates that judges should 
not air their views on disputed issues, regardless of what the rules 
say.116  For these reasons, the promises clauses may not meet strict 
scrutiny and may violate the First Amendment rights of judicial can-
didates. 
There is a strong tension between the need for an impartial 
judiciary and judicial elections in which candidates may be heard and 
voters may choose freely.117  In White, the Supreme Court identified 
unlawful restrictions on speech in judicial elections.118  Many states 
have since had difficulty determining the correct balance in policing 
judicial candidate speech.119  New York has taken an aggressive ap-
proach, applying the pledges, promises, and commitments clauses to 
limit judicial speech.120  This approach may be unconstitutional be-
 
113 White, 536 U.S. at 819-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  See also Friedland, supra note 
82, at 603 (noting Ginsburg’s discussion of promises and announcements indicates that the 
differences between the two are differences of degree, not of kind). 
114 Compare White, 536 U.S. at 771 (announcement at issue involved the criticism of a 
court decision as a “pro-abortion stance”), with La Cava, supra note 63, at 124 (pledge, 
promise, or commitment at issue involved a candidate statement that abortion is murder). 
115 See Stern, supra note 7, at 118 (stating that judicial candidates cannot anticipate disci-
plinary rulings because “determinations of implied promises are hardly self-evident,” creat-
ing a chilling effect). 
116 See The High Road, supra note 74. 
117 See White, 536 U.S. at 787. 
118 Id. at 788. 
119 See Friedland, supra note 82, at 607-08.  
120 Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 4.  
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cause of the extent to which these clauses overlap with the announce 
clause, the degree to which the two kinds of speech cannot be sepa-
rated from one another, and the limited state interest in the wider con-
text of the problems facing judicial elections.121  It is likely that the 
issue of judicial candidate speech will be before the Supreme Court 
again in the near future. 
 
121 See Friedland, supra note 82, at 607-08. 
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